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Herb —

TIME MAGAZINE

INTERVIEW WITH E. H. KNOCHE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

QUESTION: When they come down to Washington, say from New York, the editors always say, well, what do you think has been the result of the intelligence community, especially of the CIA, of the recent trials and tribulations, press stories, investigations, and so on. Has there been lasting damage? Have relations with foreign services come back from the era of suspicion? Has the process itself been restored to health, and so on, And most recently we had sort of an unpleasant letter of resignation printed in the Washington Post which accused the Agency of still condoning petty corruption and so on, so this all is sort of a package.

How is it now? Have we cured our ills and are we on our way back to health?

MR. KNOCHE: Well, let me be a little long-winded in responding to that.

QUESTION: Well, it was a long winded question.

MR. KNOCHE: I have never been one to have had any real hangups with what we had to endure in the investigations and reviews. It wasn't fun; it wasn't pleasant, and we took a lot of shots that I think were unfair, exaggerated and distorted. But after Vietnam and Watergate, in my judgment

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our number came up. It was time for CIA, which had been an agency in the government which had been almost 30 years without a spotlight put on it from external sources, and no agency of the government, no department of government, can be allowed to be untended that long.

Now I think in the main one of the reasons I survived personally in the review and investigation -- endured, I should say -- is because I always felt that fundamentally the agency and its important functions would justify themselves in the course of that kind of scrutiny. You recall, Bruce and Strobe, that in the early days of the investigations in the early part of '75, there were a hell of a lot of prominent Americans who were asking questions whether this kind of facility should exist in an open democratic society. Could we afford to keep it? have it? use it? And that question went away very early in the game, even with Senator Church and some of his colleagues who carried the most questioning kind of attitude about us.

For the most part that question has long since been put behind most prominent Americans, and it has been replaced by a question which we are dealing with, and that is, given that it is a function that must be maintained and kept, the question is how you control it, and that is a tough one. That is a very tough question. We think we have got the beginnings of it with last year's Executive Order. We have some



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1 more to say at the completion of the current reorganization
2 studies that are under way. Certainly the Senate is going
3 to be heard from, and so out of a combination of all these
4 things, there will be more guidelines, more milestones, maybe
5 even some new laws that will adjust to it.

6 I have never had any questions in my mind about the
7 basic professional discipline, loyalty, competence, professional-
8 ism, of this place and its people. Give us the guidelines,
9 give us the kinds of marching orders that the American people
10 through their instruments want us to adhere to, and we will
11 adhere. We want to be just as legal and as proper as the
12 next guy.

13 There is nothing unusual about us in that respect.

14 Now I think we took some damage in the process of
15 investigations, there was simply no way to have encountered
16 all the disclosures, many of which went to the methodologies
17 we employed to get our job done, some of which got pretty
18 close to sources.

19 Those two things of course by law we are obliged
20 to try to protect just as you newsmen and custodians of the
21 media will go to the wall in order to protect your sources.
22 That is the way we feel about it. And the closer we got to
23 those disclosures, the more nervous grew the foreign intelli-
24 gency liaison personnel and organizations with which we had
25 been carrying out intelligence liaison over the years.

Now I would like to go on background at this point for just the next sentence.

(Discussion off the record.)

Back to your question. Through some miracle which I cannot describe my own view -- and you can find people in this building that argue this point -- but my view is that we have taken precious little damage in the sense that you ask about it in your question.

Most of our sources have stayed with us. Many have expressed nervousness. Most hope that it doesn't continue. Foreign intelligence officials have told us the hemorrhaging and disclosures must come to an end, otherwise they must reexamine their relationships with us. But in the main the apparatus survived. It has been shaken and we are not helped a bit by disclosures from some of our former employees like Agee who has surfaced up the names of some of our CIA people and damaged their careers badly in the process, because there are many places in the world where you simply cannot send somebody who has been surfaced, and he and others have made the life of the opposition a good deal easier for the other side and tougher for us by the nature of their disclosures.

In the main I am ^{upbeat} ~~(unclear)~~, and I believe that we have survived the process and come through it with a better definition of guidelines that we had before. We have still

1 got an awful lot of vague charges and uncertain fields that
2 have got to be delineated better as we move ahead in the next
3 several months, many of the long-term problems which we will
4 get into later on --

5 QUESTION: What do you mean by "charges," what kind
6 of charges are you talking about? Accusation type charges
7 or instructions? What do you mean, "We have many charges
8 in many fields..."

9 MR. KNOCHE: Many challenges; that is the meaning
10 of the word I was using there. We have a good many challenges
11 ahead of us to further define and work out new arrangements,
12 some of them involving questions and propriety, legality,
13 where the turf begins and ends, and many of them requiring
14 new working relationships and definitions between organizations
15 of government as between the needs of intelligence, particularly
16 counter intelligence on the one hand, and the rights of citizens
17 and justice, small "j" and capital "J" on the other.

18 It used to be that a Director of Central Intelli-
19 gence and his colleagues were concerned almost exclusively
20 with state defense, NSC, the President. Now you have those
21 first and foremost but you have the Congress, you have the
22 Attorney General and the Justice Department in ways that you
23 never dreamed of two years ago, and that balancing of the
24 rights of the American citizen and the Constitution and the
25 concerns that the Justice Department has for legality, propriety.



1 Those things all weigh against the kind of threat we face and
2 the kind of special world that intelligence is. That balance
3 requires something that we haven't got right now.

4 On the American scene the trouble is the pendulum
5 swings from one extreme of concern for one of those concerns
6 as opposed to the other and seldom is that pendulum in the mid-
7 dle. We have got to find a way of finding out where the
8 middle ground is between those two concerns and trying to
9 keep the pendulum ^{from} swinging so widely on either side of that
10 middle ground.

11 QUESTION: Very much in passing, the Director
12 mentioned that he has a special assistant that has been cut
13 loose for a period of time, I gather months, to go through
14 the DDO and make some recommendations eventually on how things
15 are going there and what should be changed.

16 Since this was just in passing, could you amplify
17 a little bit on that, making similar kinds of self-oversight
18 innovations that have taken place since the Carter Administra-
19 tion, or perhaps some that started previous to that.

20 MR. KNOCHE: Well, let me say a word first about the
21 Director's special assistant. One of the Director's primary
22 questions, I feel, as he comes into this place, is one I would
23 think most new directors would feel and that is how do you
24 get control of a place like this, how do you really know what
25 is going on? It is far flung domestically and foreign. It has

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1 has got a lot of different nooks and crannies and compartments.
2 a lot of different types of people and skills, backgrounds.
3 How do I make myself feel good about being in control and
4 furthermore how do I attest to the fact externally to the
5 Congress, to the other overseers, the President, others, that
6 I am in command and know what is going on?

7 That, incidentally, is a question that George Bush
8 before him -- and I have been spending more time out talking
9 with groups across the countryside about intelligence -- that
10 is a question that is first and foremost in the minds of
11 many Americans. How the hell do you really know what is going
12 on in a place like that?

13 You have got secrecy and compartmentalization,
14 and you have got every opportunity to get yourself in trouble.
15 How do you control it? Well, as a professional, and I have
16 been in the place for 25 years, I feel pretty good about that.
17 There are a lot of different ways in which one maintains con-
18 trol. You have both formal and informal communications as
19 any organization does. You have staffs; you have trusted
20 lieutenants in positions of responsibility.

21 Fundamentally you have to look for integrity in
22 the people you have assigned to most of these major jobs and
23 then you test it; you probe it. You keep the system honest
24 and controlled. But you have to be in it for a while to feel
25 it and I can understand the Director's concern.



1 It is not enough for me or any of my lieutenants
2 simply to assert to the Director that it is under control.
3 He has got to make that his judgment and he has got this trust-
4 ted man who he has worked with before he has brought in and
5 he is making him his eyes and ears to do that.

6 QUESTION: Who is it, by the way?

7 MR. KNOCHE: His name is Williams, a civilian.
8 I don't know his first name.

9 QUESTION: Not from the inside, obviously.

10 MR. KNOCHE: No, brought him in from the outside.

11 QUESTION: We may not have a chance to ask him
12 again, where did he know him? He was a civilian and yet had
13 dealt with him before, and the Director of course has always
14 been in the military before.

15 MR. KNOCHE: I don't know. I think he met him at
16 the War College initially.

17 ANSWER: He is a think tank fellow. He has been
18 at Stanford Research Institute and presumably he could have
19 been doing some think tank type of work in support of the
20 Navy back in the days when Admiral Turner was in systems
21 analysis. It could go back to that, I am not sure, but they
22 have been associated for a good many years.

23 MR. KNOCHE: It used to be -- we have always had
24 the feature of the Inspector General in the agency and it has
25 usually been a strong feature. We also have an internal and
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1 independent auditing system which keeps the books examined
2 and straight and uncovers any disorders in them.

3 QUESTION: Maintains all three sets, right?

4 MR. KNOCHE: But the Inspector General had become kind of
5 a little placid over the years. It made surveys periodically of
6 each and every component, by unit. It didn't really take
7 problems and look across organization to examine problems
8 and how they were impacting on the agency, and those component
9 surveys became just a little bit too pat. There wasn't too
10 much renewal built into it and Bill Colby, when he was
11 Director, and faced with a lot of resource problems too, as we
12 all have for several years, decided to cut back the investment
13 in the Inspector General.

14 We always had senior, very satisfactory people
15 doing this work. You have to, by its nature. He wanted to
16 put them back into the line, put them to work, and cut the IG
17 back to fundamentally a grievance hearing body which it
18 always was, too.

19 Well, that of course ran into a buzzsaw the
20 minute the investigators began to look into it beginning with
21 the Rockefeller commission in '75. They found the abuses of
22 which really most of them well predated the decision to cut
23 back on the IG. but nevertheless they found that a terrible
24 weakness in terms of having to correct ourselves and respond
25 to outside oversight.



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1 The Inspector General thing has been beefed up to
2 a fare-thee-well and the General Counsel was one that was
3 sometimes used, most of the times not used, to consult on
4 proposed projects and programs. It didn't always suit every-
5 body's fancy to ask the General Counsel what he thought. He
6 tended to slow up the process, inhibit a little flexibility.
7 It wasn't that they feared what he would come up with. It was
8 just that it wasn't a unit of agency that was used very often
9 except in times of trouble and that had to change and anything
10 new and different that we propose now, any major new program
11 or change of an existing program, will inevitably go through
12 the general counsel for some kind of review before we act upon
13 it.

14 They also killed two birds with one stone last year
15 when George Bush was Director and we were in the process of
16 reconstructing the management of the place. One of the
17 things that I had felt quite strongly was that we had not
18 leavened ourselves sufficiently with new blood from the outside
19 at senior levels and we tended for the last decade or so always
20 to promote from within. The Deputy always replaced the Chief
21 and so on. And in an effort to get some new thinking in here
22 and some new blood, we went outside for the General Counsel.

23 I don't know if you are scheduled to meet with him
24 or not, Tony ^{Lapham} ~~Lapham~~ is his name, but he is worth a half hour's
25 time if you have got it, because his insights into the new world

1 of his he lives would be quite interesting for you to get.

2 But he has been the point man on so many of these
3 things, particularly with the Attorney General, the Justice,
4 the President's counsel, the definition of the Executive
5 Order, the conscience for our new regulations which reflect
6 all the new guidelines. Tony ^{Lapham} ~~Lapin~~ has been the guide; he
7 has been a great strength to us.

8 QUESTION: What about fresh blood at lower levels?
9 Has the recruiting program continued apace, have you been
10 able to attract good people in the lower ranks and on the
11 other end?

12 MR. KNOCHE: I don't know precisely what to attri-
13 bute that to but our recruiting prospects and capabilities
14 have never been better and we are even welcome on most campuses.
15 We do our recruiting openly. There is nothing spooky about
16 it at all. There was a time eight or ten years ago when our
17 recruiters simply couldn't set foot on campuses and we were
18 somewhat inhibited. But the recruiting is up and we think
19 the quality of what we are getting is up and beyond what it
20 was 10, 15, 20 years ago.

21 I am inclined to say that the fundamental reason is
22 that it is cold outside. There aren't that many jobs available.
23 But I also have to say that obviously our image hasn't suf-
24 fered all that badly in the eyes of a lot of modern-day youth.


25 Now you have to bear in mind the kind of youth we



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1 are going after for the most part. Inevitably they are gradu-
2 ate students. We can afford to wait for somebody a little
3 more mature, a little deeper degree. In almost all of our
4 new recruits for professional work come with advanced degrees.
5 We don't aim exclusively for egg heads. We do look for a mix
6 of interests and abilities, and the athletic type as well as
7 the kid who carries a school book. But it means a slightly
8 more mature kind of recruit.

9 We are not going into undergraduate schools
10 recruiting in a systematic way. On the other hand we go to
11 black schools. We are trying like everybody else in the
12 government to increase the number of blacks on our roles and
13 we strike out almost totally there. We get some, we get
14 expressions of interest, but the blacks who are interested in
15 coming into the government for the most part are not interested
16 in coming into international organizations or ones that are
17 charged up with national security affairs. ~~Too many of them~~
18 ~~had run-ins with law enforcement for some peculiar reason~~
19 ~~or the other and they are far more interested in going where~~
20 ~~they think their priorities are, to HUD or HEW, other parts~~
21 ~~of the government.~~



22 So we are trying to find ways of bringing in greater
23 numbers of blacks through lateral entries, those who have
24 already had some experience in industry or government, and
25 would be willing to come in from the side. .

1 QUESTION: Or from elsewhere in the government
2 or military.

3 MR. KNOCHE: Sure.

4 QUESTION: Because there are a lot of blacks go
5 into the military.

6 MR. KNOCHE: That is right.

7 Now on the other hand when you talk about recruiting
8 and that lateral entry of blacks, we are an organization which
9 has been topped off now for several years. Our peak was in
10 1969 at the height of the Vietnamese War. In numbers of posi-
11 tions and people we have fallen off 25 percent since that
12 time. And as we have scaled back and then in the last two
13 or three years held at a common ceiling, there aren't all that
14 many opportunities. We have to keep a flow of people coming
15 in to match up with the flow of those going out, but it is
16 not an extremely large flow.

17 We have got a current problem that is confounding
18 us. As you know, executive pay in government was frozen
19 for so many years and now it is ^{unblocked} ~~on-bleek(?)~~ with the action
20 of Congress a few months ago. A person's retirement pay is
21 calculated on the high three years in government. Well, most
22 of your senior people now are going to try very hard to stay
23 on the rolls for these next three years to increase their
24 retirements that much. That is going to confront us with a
25 problem because we cannot afford that ~~lemon~~ in a hump

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1 to develop. We have got to continue to keep the opportunities
2 open for people, to keep this flow inward and upward orderly.
3 So we are headed for some crunch times here with people
4 including some of our senior people.

5 QUESTION: Can you give us any real numbers, or
6 is that classified? You say you are down 25 percent.

7 MR. KNOCHE: You know, I cannot give you those
8 numbers. I would be willing to give them to you on deep
9 background.

10 QUESTION: You sort of alluded to it, that during
11 the crisis period one area that took a hell of a beating was
12 counter intelligence. Engleton and deputies and everybody
13 out. How has that been rebuilt now? Is it back to health
14 in your view?

15 MR. KNOCHE: No, but I think it is on its way back
16 to health. There are a lot of things that stand in the way
17 on total health. One is there is no central body anywhere
18 in government that has a responsibility for counter intelli-
19 gence in a policy setting kind of way. You have sub organiza-
20 tions under the NSC that are responsible for passing on covert
21 action, the Special Coordinating Committee, before it the
22 Forty
23 Fordy (?) Committee, and all those things. You have oversight
24 bodies within the Executive and the Congress, but you don't
25 have anything like it in counter intelligence. Then you have
this bifurcation between FBI and CIA where CIA is responsible

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for counter intelligence ^{abroad} and ^{FBI for} security internally within the United States. That is the way I like it because if you combined those two responsibilities in any one department, it would be too much power in my view for that department, but in workaday terms that is a very difficult thing to do to convert those two agencies in effective ways.

It means that if a Soviet intelligence operative in Geneva, Switzerland, is stationed there in Geneva, he is watched by us and we keep in general touch with what he is up to and keep a book on him. The minute he transfers, say, to the U.N. Mission of the Soviets in New York and notify the FBI and tell them what we know, and then it is over to them. When he rotates from there and goes to, say, Bogota, Colombia, it is our responsibility again.

QUESTION: Could I ask another question there because it has always interested me, this business about counter intelligence splitting or bifurcating at the water's edge. What if you were following another agent in Stockholm and you discovered that there was a very important connection between him and the guy in New York, maybe they are both running some third agent or something like that, just hypothetically. Can you go to the FBI and get a full brief on what that first guy who is now in New York has been up to to fit in with your own analysis of what the second guy is up to in Stockholm, or will the FBI tell you, "Sorry, now you are treading on domestic

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1 turf."

2 MR. KNOCHE: Well, that is part of the problem I
3 am talking about. The textbook says, yes, you can. And
4 the two agencies shall consult and all the rest of it. But
5 people are involved in that and their relationships with
6 one another at the working level may differ. Their under-
7 standing of how dangerous that New York thing may differ
8 entirely. On the basis of what we know about Stockholm, we
9 may conclude that we have got a huge case here that needs
10 doubling of the resources and some new approach to it,
11 whereas the guy on the basis of following it in New York
12 cannot get himself sexed up about it at all.

13 So that is the ^way the American system is. It
14 is always going to have some flaws to it. You do your best
15 to improve it.

16 I know that the Senate Select Committee, certainly
17 it will have my vote of endorsement when it comes to that,
18 is moving in the direction of urging that there be an NSC body
19 for the centralizing of policy considerations concerning counter-
20 intelligence. I think the day has come -- that is an idea that
21 the time has come.

22 QUESTION: The standing NSC subcommittee, in effect?

23 MR. KNOCHE: Yes, that is right.

24 QUESTION: Is that an idea whose time has come
25 as part of PRIM-11? Is that being floated around in the
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1 current of what I heard described as gentlemanly articulation
2 of the problems over how to reorganize the intelligence
3 community.

4 MR. KNOCHE: I think that those involved in PRIM-11
5 have taken a quick and furtive look at counter intelligence
6 and wrung their hands a little bit and said, "You know, we
7 really ought to do something about that but now is not the
8 time." One of the difficulties is, you can talk about CIA
9 and FBI and that is a problem area, but the services have
10 counter intelligence capabilities that stretch from here to
11 there and the DCI is the main intelligence official in this
12 government. ^{He} ~~It~~ doesn't have any real responsibility for
13 military service counter intelligence at all. How do you
14 put all these things together?

15 But fundamentally the reason why counter intelligence
16 is suffering I think at this stage is because the pendulum
17 that I described earlier is so far over in the direction of
18 the protection of the Constitutional rights that it is almost
19 impossible to undertake any kind of special counter intelligence
20 ^{activities} ~~meetings~~ when an American person is involved either here or
21 ~~measures~~ -
abroad.

22 Now I may have exaggerated that and I know that is
23 a highly debatable kind of subject. I described it earlier
24 as one that has got to be worked out. There has got to be some
25 spotlight put on this issue but I do feel and I am trying



1 very hard not to be paranoid about this, that until we resolve
2 this issue of where the proper balance is, that the counter
3 intelligence forces in this country are deeply inhibited and
4 there may be some great dangers in that.

5 Now I don't want to overdo that, but that is a
6 professional concern that I have an all the more reason ^{why} where
7 we need this centralized body to begin pulling things together
8 to understand the nature of counter intelligence work across
9 the government as a whole, drawing some conclusions as to what
10 the state of the threat may be and where appropriate dramatiz-
11 ing those for popular education of people so they can
12 begin making up their own minds on it.

13 One thing that is of interest to me is as many blows
14 as intelligence took, as many criticisms as it took, in the
15 Church Committee's final report the strongest pro-element of
16 Church Committee's report, if you want to take a look at it,
17 is in the counter intelligence field. More and more of every-
18 thing is what they wanted.

19 QUESTION: When you express a concern are you
20 expressing a concern about the Agency? Obviously it is target
21 number one for penetration. Are you worried about your own
22 ability to check on Agency employees?

23 MR. KNOCHE: Yes, to some extent, though that
24 is not a problem that I would put anywhere near a front
25 burner. I have got other problems that I would confront



1 first. I still think there is enough -- we have got a
2 recognized capacity and a proved capacity to do security
3 checks on people who apply to us for employment. We do have
4 a good and healthy exchange with the FBI so that if they have
5 anything adverse on some people who are applying to us for
6 employment they know about it.

7 As an art form within the Agency, counter intelli-
8 gency had sunk to a discipline which no intelligence officer
9 really wanted to have anything to do with. Part of that had
10 to do with Engleton's approach which was based on his belief
11 that to be a proper counter intelligence officer you should
12 be one for 12, 15, 20 years. Our own view now is that the
13 work by its nature where you have constantly to build
14 assumptions which are always negative in outlook, paranoid
15 if you want to put it that way, can of its own almost guaran-
16 tee a form of illness. And we want to find ways of exposing
17 more and more of our officers to counter intelligence as
18 a natural part of their work. It is just one more dimension
19 in all of the facets required of a man for all seasons in
20 intelligence work these days.

21 So we want to make it a discipline which has
22 greater attraction, is considered to be interesting, is
23 considered to be part of the career path and through which
24 you would rotate. You wouldn't be in it for more than two
25 or three years at a time.



1 So we are trying to train more people in how it
2 is done and what can be expected from it and we are trying
3 to make it a more attractive kind of career discipline.
4 Until we get those things done a little better and we are
5 at it a little longer, I would say we haven't restored it
6 to full health yet.

7 QUESTION: I am conscious of the time and we
8 promised we wouldn't keep you much beyond 4:00. Is this Admini-
9 stration both in the White House and on the seventh floor out
10 here pushing for a new law that would put (unclear) sanctions
11 into the secrecy oath, and Bill Colby was very much anxious
12 to tighten that.

13 MR. KNOCHE: Well, I am not sure that the
14 Administration is. If I have anything to do with it here
15 on the seventh floor, we will, and that takes me to a few of what
16 I think are the most important problems we face, at least
17 I think I face them inside CIA.

18 First is how in the midst of guidelines, restric-
19 tions, no-no's, new laws, and all the rest, to maintain
20 creativity and imagination. The normal human tendency when
21 you are living in an environment of that kind is to keep
22 your head down. Don't try anything too risky. Don't get
23 yourself identified as a fellow who is apt to go over the
24 deep end in terms of propriety and certain legality. On
25 the other hand, the kind of work we do requires the utmost



1 in boldness and imagination. The development of a U-2,
2 the willingness ^{to} ~~of~~ invest in a U-2 on the basis of a drawing
3 on the back of an envelope, the motivating force behind a
4 good many of the more productive ^{technical intelligence collection} ~~overhead intelligence~~
5 ^{systems} satellites, the imaginative development of espionage nets
6 abroad. You don't do it and guarantee it in an atmosphere
7 of negation.

8 Once again getting back to that business of
9 penicilums and balance, how do you balance the need to be
10 wise, prudent and proper against the need to always be willing
11 to listen to the new idea, the new approach, while chasing
12 somebody out the front door just because they came up with
13 the idea. That is a tough one; that is a real tough one, and
14 the only way I know how to confront it and face it is to
15 engage all levels of this organization in dialogue, talk
16 about it. You cannot impose things. You cannot decree these
17 things. People have got to build a consensus and feel it.

18 Part of this thing though, it might strike you as an
19 unrelated aspect is whether or not there should be a code of
20 ethics for the intelligence profession. You can get people
21 to divide on this issue. Many of our officers insisted there
22 should be one. They tend, however, to be most of the officers
23 who are not involved in the dirty handed business of espionage.
24 Those involved in espionage simply say, "We are breaking the
25 laws of foreign governments." What do we do? Construct a



1 code of ethics around illegality? Try to write it. Try to
2 put words in English around the concept of that.

3 Well, I think we need one and we have got some
4 dialogue started internally in the organization. I know
5 Admiral Turner feels we need one, too. But I don't want to
6 simply write it on the seventh floor and say that is it. I
7 think it has got to come up from within this organization
8 as a result of debate and give and take and consensus and
9 so on.

10 QUESTION: Can you tell us about the format for the
11 debate? Are you having regular meetings with representatives?

12 MR. KNOCHE: What I have done beginning about six
13 months ago was to put together a cross sectional group, told
14 them to go off on retreat. Then I went down and met with
15 them for the opening hour or two discussing this creativity
16 versus no-no's and the possibility of the code of ethics with
17 this group, asked them to mull it over amongst themselves,
18 pro and con, for a weekend or so, and out of that came some
19 ideas. One of them was that a debate on this topic or a
20 seminar on this topic be built into most of our internal
21 training courses which has been done.

22 So out of each and every training course we get the
23 result of what has come to be kind of a brainstorming on this.
24 We haven't got any ultimate solution on it yet but the juices
25 are flowing.



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1 QUESTION: A sort of ethic seminar as part of
2 the training course that every new recruit goes through.

3 MR. KNOCHE: Now the second problem and it relates
4 really to your question, is how to make the intelligence
5 product more widely available within government and to the
6 public while at the same time protecting intelligence sources
7 and methods. There are ways of more adroitly writing our
8 reports so that we don't give away sources and methods but can
9 impart our conclusions.

10 This is one of Admiral Turner's new policies, to
11 move increasingly in this direction. Well, it presents us with
12 a lot of dilemmas and we are going to take some heat. He
13 is willing to take some heat on this when we do it.

14 In the oil memoranda which you know so well, there
15 are others like it that are going to be coming out soon. They
16 are going to open us up to the charge that we are somehow
17 or other either advancing a political course set by the
18 Administration or that we are politicizing or propagandizing
19 the American public and we are not paid to do that.

20 QUESTION: Or lobbying for a particular point of
21 view.

22 MR. KNOCHE: And until this process gets more
23 regularized and all of us get more systematically inured to
24 the fact that this is just kind of a flowing fact of life,
25 those criticisms are going to be difficult for us to deal

1 with.

2 There is another problem. When you wash out the
3 attribution to sources and methods, you are in effect turning
4 out undocumented assertions and people like you are going to
5 have great trouble with them. Why the hell should you believe
6 them?

7 QUESTION: We don't trust information unless we
8 know the source.

9 MR. KNOCHE: That is right.

10 QUESTION: But we print a lot of undocumented
11 assertions.

12 QUESTION: Based on our own sources.

13 MR. KNOCHE: So it is a problem.

14 QUESTION: You mentioned these reports, if I can
15 just come back to that. Our take-out on the intelligence
16 community isn't going to be out until a week from Monday.
17 Could you allow us to anticipate in print a couple of the
18 topics that are going to be touched on in these forthcoming
19 reports?

20 MR. KNOCHE: If there is anything coming out
21 between you and your publication time, I would certainly do
22 that, but I am not aware that there is any more, is there?

23 QUESTION: Would it make life difficult for you if
24 we just said what the topics were?

25 MR. KNOCHE: Yes, it would, because they are still

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1 QUESTION: We certainly don't want to do that.

2 MR. KNOCHE: Strobe, there are still debates on some
3 of these topics and there are other precincts to be heard
4 from on some of these things so there is no final decisions
5 made, but I would say -- wouldn't you, Herb? -- that the
6 Admiral is fully intent upon going this route?

7 QUESTION: We will have to rely on our clandestine
8 sources to find out --

9 MR. KNOCHE: But the business of how to protect
10 sources and methods defies us all.

11 QUESTION: Journalists have gone to jail over this
12 so there is an understanding.

13 MR. KNOCHE: And every time I talk to an agency
14 group they want to know why we aren't doing something to get
15 a new an tougher law to deal with this. Well, there is no
16 way to answer that except to say in practical political
17 terms that issue is considered draconian on the Hill and the
18 number of votes you could get for a tougher law you could put
19 in the palm of your hand. It is simply not a viable political
20 proposition at this stage.

21 QUESTION: Okay. Well this has been very, very
22 helpful indeed and we would hope it might be possible to
23 talk to you again from time to time.

24 MR. KNOCHE: Sure; don't hesitate, and if you
25 want to clarify anything that I have left vague, just let me

1 know.

2 QUESTION: You have always been reputed to be
3 a non-partisan type but I see nothing but elephants.

4 MR. KNOCHE: Somebody asked me if I wanted a chisel
5 one of these days and turn them into donkeys.

6 QUESTION: Well, here is a tennis ball. There
7 are other interests.

8 MR. KNOCHE: Well, there is nothing political
9 about the elephants. Most of these things are gifts from
10 foreign intelligence guys. If they are under \$50 you get
11 a chance to keep them. If they are not, you just sort of
12 display them.

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END

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HEH:

✓ P 10 Line 24: Lapham sted Lapin

✓ P 11 Line 6: ditto

✓ P 12 Line 18: Question the wisdom of singling out problems with the law as a reason why "we strike out almost totally" (line 13) with hiring blacks.

✓ P 14 Line 25 (to top of next page): Meant to say FBI rpt FBI is responsible within the US. (sted CIA)

✓ P 21 Line 4: Official admission of satellite intelligence?

STAT

(db 6/7/77)

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